Religious Experience without Belief? Toward an Imaginative Account of Religious Engagement by Griffioen, Amber
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/97890043�8600_006
Chapter 4
Religious Experience without Belief? Toward an 
Imaginative Account of Religious Engagement
Amber L. Griffioen
Our dreams are more romantic
Than the world we see
And if the things we dream about
Don’t happen to be so
That’s just an unimportant technicality
From the song ‘Make Believe’ in Showboat: The Musical
∵
It is commonly supposed that a certain kind of belief is necessary for religious 
experience. This claim gets cashed out in various ways in the philosophical 
and theological literature. For example, on some accounts religious experience 
is subjectively self-verifying – that is, one cannot have a religious experience 
without in some sense believing in the existence of the intentional object of 
the experience.1 On other, more nuanced accounts, religious experience always 
minimally involves a belief about the causal origin of the experience. (That is, 
it is not possible to have an experience of God if one sincerely judges the expe-
rience to be purely naturalistically explicable).2 Yet it is not clear that this must 
be so. In what follows, I will defend the possibility that a subject could have a 
genuine emotional religious experience without thereby necessarily believing 
that the purported object of her experience corresponds to reality and/or is the 
1   Rudolf Otto might hold a version of this view. For Otto, it seems that although genuine 
religious experience itself is technically non-conceptual and non-discursive, experiencing 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans still appears to involve a belief in the existence of the 
“numinous”. See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1958).
2   See, for example, Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley, CA: California University 
Press, 1985).
73-88_HARDTKE_Chapter 4.indd   73 14/07/2016   6:22:12 PM
74 Griffioen
cause of her experience. To do so, I will put forward what I call an imaginative 
account of religious engagement. Imaginative engagement, I will argue, may 
evoke emotional religious experiences that may be said to be both genuine and 
appropriate, despite not necessarily including beliefs of the aforementioned 
kind. Indeed, I maintain that such religious engagement is compatible not 
only with non-belief but also with disbelief. (For purposes of brevity, however, 
I will usually simply refer to the distinction between ‘believers’ and ‘non-
believers’, which is meant to include not only those who remain agnostic or 
who lack a belief one way or the other but also those who reflectively disbe-
lieve or deny the truth of the relevant propositions.)
 Religious Engagement: An Imaginative Account
We often set up the terms ‘imagination’ and ‘reality’ as contrasts. Yet this can 
be misleading. In many instances, imagination is required for us to represent 
things we take to really exist or have happened, as when we represent very 
large or small things (like galaxies or DNA) to ourselves or when we picture spa-
tially or temporally non-present events (as when we imagine what Mardi Gras 
in New Orleans or the Battle of the Bulge must be/have been like). Engagement 
with religious concepts, too, requires a significant degree of imaginative activ-
ity, even for those who believe those concepts correspond to reality. Engaging 
with concepts like ‘God’, ‘the Transcendent’, ‘Ultimate Reality’, ‘the beatific 
vision’, and so on – and being able to understand and meaningfully utter sen-
tences like ‘The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son’ – seems 
not only to require imagination but also to take us to the very limits of what 
we as finite human subjects can represent to ourselves. Likewise, regardless 
of whether any particular religious story is true or not, to understand the 
whole of the history of the world as a kind of ‘divine narrative’ – one featur-
ing, for example, the interaction of natural and supernatural agents, a struggle 
between good and evil, or an eschatological resolution – requires an imagi-
native narrative understanding that goes beyond mere claims about certain 
historical or empirical ‘facts’. Moreover, participation in religious ritual, be it 
in the form of taking the Eucharist, engaging in merit-making, or even simply 
praying, involves opening oneself up imaginatively to the idea of something 
which putatively transcends our empirical understanding, even if it is also lim-
ited by our own conceptual constraints. In all these ways, the imagination is no 
stranger to the sphere of religion. If anything, it appears an essential part of it.3
3   Garrett Green makes a similar claim in Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination 
(San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1989).
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Yet such imaginative activity is not restricted to believing subjects. Non-
believers, too, can employ their imaginations in the service of religious partici-
pation and engagement, even if they do not believe the propositions involved 
in such engagement are literally true or that the content of the concepts they 
employ corresponds to something actual. Indeed, it seems perfectly possible 
that a subject may have (good) practical reasons for pursuing a life of religious 
participation, despite finding herself unable (or unwilling) to be completely 
confident of the truth of that particular tradition’s content.4 For example, an 
epistemically cautious subject may suspend judgment regarding certain arti-
cles of faith and yet consistently adopt a hopeful or optimistic attitude toward 
them. One may even believe these propositions are, strictly speaking, false, 
yet imaginatively engage with the relevant concepts in ways similar to those 
in which we engage with fictional entities and settings. In fact, I think this is 
something we commonly see when we look at what many religious adherents 
‘on the ground’ actually do, as opposed to focusing on more abstract philo-
sophical and theological treatments of the religious life.
Of course, the religious believer employs her imagination to represent 
something she thinks actually exists. She thinks that when she says, ‘God is 
omniscient’, she says something that is true. What about religiously-engaged 
non-believers like those in the examples above? On one understanding (e.g., 
that put forward by certain versions of theological fictionalism),5 the non-
believer thinks that the statement ‘God is omniscient’ is literally false, but she 
‘pretends’ or ‘makes believe’ that the statement is true. She acts ‘as if ’ there 
were such a being as God who knows everything there is to know. Now surely 
there is something right about this picture of the religious non-believer, in 
the sense that she does willfully enter into a certain imaginative context, one 
which employs concepts and makes claims that she thinks do not necessarily 
correspond to reality. Yet there is no need for us to say that just because the 
non-believer takes these statements not to refer to really existing entities and 
states of affairs she must take them to be false tout court. Just as there is a sense 
in which the claim ‘Jane Eyre is a governess’ is true (it is wrong, for example, 
to say that Jane Eyre is a professional baseball player), there is a very legiti-
mate sense in which, when the religiously committed non-believer says ‘God 
is omniscient’, she likewise says something that is true – at least from within 
the context of certain monotheistic traditions. Similarly, the statement ‘God 
4   There are several candidates for such reasons, ranging from moral to aesthetic to purely 
prudential, and (as I discuss below) many corresponding attitudes that one might adopt 
(such as hope, optimism, acceptance, etc.).
5   See, for example, Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996) and 
Andrew Eshleman, “Can an Atheist Believe in God?”, Religious Studies 4 (2005), 183–199.
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is triune’ is false from within Jewish or Muslim contexts, just as the statement 
‘Captain James T. Kirk was born in Minnesota’ is false in the Star Trek Universe.6 
So there is no need here to say that religious believers and non-believers within 
a certain tradition are necessarily talking past each other when they engage in 
religious discourse. In fact, if we accept that many or most religious concepts 
require a certain degree of imaginative engagement on the part of all religious 
subjects, we might be in a better position to examine how dialogue within a 
certain religious context can get off the ground in the first place.7
So just what is the difference between the religious believer and non-believer 
in such imaginative contexts? From within the religious context, the gap might 
not be as great as we may have first thought. Still, there will be a relevant dis-
tinction between the two. One possible way of understanding this difference 
is to say whereas believers believe (and thereby accept) that p, non-believers 
merely accept that p. What is the difference? According to William Alston, 
whereas belief is a non-voluntary dispositional state in which we simply ‘find’ 
ourselves, acceptance involves a voluntary mental act. Alston claims that both 
believers that p and ‘mere acceptors’ that p will be disposed to behave in simi-
lar ways as far as action regarding p is concerned (e.g., affirming p in relevant 
action-contexts, using p as a premise in their theoretical and practical reason-
ing, and so on), with one minor difference: for the non-believer, “[t]he com-
plex dispositional state engendered by accepting p will definitely not include a 
tendency to feel that p if the question of whether p arises”, whereas for believers 
this tendency is present.8 But, importantly, the question of ‘whether p’, as a 
question that calls for ontological or metaphysical speculation (or one about 
whether some event actually happened), is not necessarily or even commonly 
6   According to the Star Trek canon, Captain Kirk was (or will be) born in Iowa.
7   The notion of ‘true or false within a religious context’ will, of course, raise interesting 
questions regarding religious disagreement and interreligious dialogue; see, for example, 
some of the problems raised in Victoria Harrison, “Philosophy of Religion, Fictionalism, and 
Religious Diversity”, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 68 (2010), 43–58. I do 
not have space to go into these issues here, but I think a discussion of what inter- (and intra-) 
religious disagreement and dialogue might look like on a fictionalist account – or on any 
antirealist picture, for that matter – is warranted. This may also provide us with a motivation 
to move away from strictly fictionalist and toward what I am calling ‘imaginative’ accounts 
of religious discourse, where the issue centers not specifically around whether or which God 
exists but rather around a discussion that focuses on the evaluation of which imaginative 
concepts are most useful, helpful or morally salient.
8   William Alston, “Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith”, in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, 
ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 10–27 
(10), additional emphasis mine.
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a question taken up from inside the religious tradition. And where it is taken 
up from within the tradition, what does it matter if some individuals lack a 
tendency to ‘feel’ that p in these contexts? It does not mean they never feel that 
p – rather, it is only from the standpoint of ontological speculation that they 
differ in feeling from their believing counterparts. But this is simply to affirm 
that there is sometimes a phenomenological difference between believers and 
non-believers when it comes to ontology, which is, of course, exactly what we 
would expect. So acceptors need not believe that p, though presumably they 
must approve of p in some sense. As Daniel Howard-Snyder notes, belief that p 
is not required for what he calls “propositional faith”, but rather only a positive 
cognitive and affective/conative stance toward p.9 One such stance, as James 
Muyskens has suggested, might be that of hope.10 Thus, as hinted at above, 
perhaps the non-believer need merely hope that p be true, even if she does not 
believe it.11 In any case, it seems clear that one can practically commit oneself 
to religious propositions without having to believe them to actually ‘match up’ 
with reality.12
Likewise, one can sincerely accept and adhere to religious norms without 
belief, which may involve one’s being further committed to engaging in certain 
religious practices and rituals. For example, we can imagine someone commit-
ting herself to wearing the Hijab without believing that it is actually divinely 
ordained – perhaps because it encourages religious devotion, modesty, and 
humility. Or we can imagine a Taoist burning joss paper during Ghost Month, 
even though he is unsure whether his deceased ancestors are actually benefit-
ted by such a practice. In neither case, need the practitioner be convinced of 
9    Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Propositional Faith: What It Is and What It Is Not”, American 
Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013), 357–372. Howard-Snyder puts forward a few other crite-
ria for propositional faith as well, with which I take some issue, but that is not relevant to 
my discussion here.
10   James Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope: Conceptual Foundations of Religion (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1979).
11   Of course, hoping that p requires believing that p is at least possible, and I would argue 
that even this need not be the case on an imaginative account of religious engagement. 
However, as Greg Landini has pointed out in personal conversation, even if a person 
believes that p is metaphysically impossible, she might still hope that she is wrong about 
this.
12   Moreover, even among believers there are many different ways in which one can under-
stand or interpret religious propositions – literally, analogically, metaphorically, nar-
ratively, mythologically, and so on. Thus, once we move beyond straightforward literal 
interpretation of religious propositions, the gap between the believer and the non-
believer appears very narrow indeed.
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the truth of the relevant propositions, though he or she may certainly accept 
or hope or act as if they are. Further, as I have intimated, I think sincere reli-
gious engagement is compatible even with disbelief. This is because what is 
required for sincerity in the case of religious engagement has more to do with 
the strength of one’s practical commitment to the relevant aspect of the reli-
gious tradition than with that of one’s epistemic commitment to it. To be sure, 
the latter often does strongly inform the former – and sincere religious engage-
ment may, as a matter of contingent psychological fact, generally be less effort-
ful for the believer than the non-believer. But even this does not follow with 
necessity. For one may have a strong belief that p and yet be hostile or uncom-
mitted to acting on it.13
So perhaps the relevant distinction between the religiously committed 
believer and non-believer is that, although both may be equally practically 
committed to certain religious propositions and concepts, when the former 
steps ‘outside’ of the strictly religious context or examines it from a critical 
standpoint, she affirms that, for example, God is an actually existing feature 
of the universe, whereas the latter denies this. Another way to put this is that 
when the believer engages in ontological or metaphysical speculation – when 
she thinks about what there really is and how it is constituted – she affirms that 
the statements she makes within the religious contexts really refer. The non-
believer, on the other hand, denies this. But although this may be one way to 
engage with religion (critically, from the outside), it is certainly not what reli-
gion is centrally about. Put a bit differently, although metaphysical speculation 
or natural theology may be an important – perhaps even essential – feature of 
engagement within some religious and mystical traditions, it does not seem 
to me that the essence of religion per se is to be found in existence-assertions 
regarding correspondence with reality.14
Still, one might claim that for the ‘truly’ religious individual, there is no 
‘stepping outside’ the religious context. Religion, one might argue, colors all 
aspects of experience, such that anyone who can compartmentalize and view 
her religious tradition ‘from the outside’ cannot be said to be sincerely reli-
gious engaged. It is easy (and appropriate), the objector might claim, to step 
out of the fictional Jane Eyre or Star Trek universe once in a while, but it is not 
13   As James 2:19 states, “The demons also believe and shudder”. But surely they do not count 
among the religiously faithful.
14   This is not to say that certain religious propositions do not perform an explanatory func-
tion. It is, however, to deny that a concern for explanation is at the heart of the religious 
life, even if some “proto-religions” may have their origin in efficient-causal explanatory 
attributions.
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so simple (nor ought it be) to step outside of a particular religious context. 
Yet this is to confuse the matter. Although it is true that, ideally, religion is more 
than a set of practices – it is a form of life, a way of being – this does not mean 
one cannot step outside it or consider it from alternative perspectives. If it 
were, then interreligious dialogue and dialogue between the non-religious and 
the religious would be doomed from the get-go. (I know there are those who 
support this view, but I find it overly pessimistic.) Second, even though the 
religious believer and non-believer affirm inconsistent things about the make-
up of the universe in extra- or supra-religious contexts, this does not mean 
that their experience within that context is relevantly different, or that their 
lives as a whole cannot be equally enriched by engagement with a religious 
form of life.
However, in order to make this latter assertion, I will have to defend the 
claim that religiously engaged non-believers are capable of having genuine 
religious experiences of the kind relevant to a meaningful religious life. For 
although the level of religious commitment may be the same between certain 
believers and non-believers, if the latter are – by virtue of their non-belief – 
incapable of genuine religious experience, this may count as a strike against the 
kind of imaginative model I am proposing here.
 Applying the Imaginative Account: The Case of Religious 
Experience
First, we must say a bit more about what we mean by the term ‘religious expe-
rience’. On the view I am advocating here, in order to count as a specifically 
religious experience, the subject has to view her experience in light of some 
particular religious tradition or conceptual schema, and that particular tradi-
tion or schema must enter in some way into the content of her experience. 
Thus, a mere feeling of contingency might not count as a straightforwardly 
religious experience, but the “feeling of absolute dependence” understood in 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sense or the “creaturely feeling” we find in Rudolf 
Otto might, assuming they are interpreted from within a religious framework.15 
Otherwise they might count as mystical or spiritual (but not specifically reli-
gious) experiences. In other words, although I am not taking a position on 
whether there is some perennial element independent of interpretation and 
common to all experiences of a ‘spiritual’ nature, I do think that to count as 
15   See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 
trans. Hugh R. Mackintosh and James S. Stewart (London: T&T Clark, 1999).
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religious, an experience must be viewed through the conceptual lens of some 
particular religious tradition or traditions.16 However, little of what I am going 
to say here hinges on this (admittedly vague) account being correct.
Further, when I say ‘genuine’ religious experience, I do not mean that it must 
be understood factively – as only genuine if it was, in fact, caused by what it is 
about. (Though ‘what it is about’ is sometimes more difficult to get at than we 
might think. I return to this below.) Finally, I should note that I am focusing on 
an important subset of religious experiences, namely those experiences that 
are fundamentally affective or emotional in nature. The term ‘religious expe-
rience’ may encompass a wider set of experiences than the merely affective 
(such as intellectual apprehensions, visions and auditions, sensed presences, 
out of body experiences, and so on), but these are not my concern here. What 
concerns me is whether the religiously engaged non-believer can genuinely 
experience religious emotions, and how (if at all) they might differ from the 
religious emotions of believers.
Engaging with religious concepts and propositions requires some cognitive 
accomplishment on the part of the religious subject, yet I have claimed that 
this cognitive role a) may (and perhaps must) involve the religious imagina-
tion and b) need not involve full doxastic commitment, or belief. I have also 
hinted at the idea that the non-believer – who doubts that such concepts and 
propositions refer to actually existing entities – might engage with them in a 
way similar to the way we engage with concepts and propositions in fictional 
settings.17 It will be helpful here to examine this idea a bit more closely. When 
we engage with fiction sincerely – that is, when we immerse ourselves in a 
piece of fiction or otherwise ‘take it seriously’ – it is not as though we forget 
or somehow fail to realize that we are dealing with situations we take to be 
non-actual. Yet we do tend to distract ourselves from reflecting too heavily on 
this fact. Indeed, fictional engagement often requires a kind of a temporary 
‘letting go of ’ or psychologically ‘distancing oneself from’ certain aspects of 
(perceived) reality that might conflict with our being able to take the fiction 
seriously.18 And this is something we do successfully on a regular basis without 
16   By ‘religious tradition’ I have in mind something social, institutional, and historical. But 
I am aware that there are competing scholarly understandings of religion. Still, I think 
most of these theoretical accounts are compatible with the idea of religion as a kind of 
‘lens’ or ‘orientation’ through which an experience may be interpreted.
17   This is not the only way one may imaginatively engage as a non-believer, but it is the one 
I will focus on in the remainder of this essay.
18   For example, in order to enjoy the television show “24”, one must perhaps not reflect too 
heavily on the fact that mere mortals do not generally exemplify the physical resilience 
of a Jack Bauer, or be willing to accept that one can make it across Los Angeles in ten 
minutes during rush hour.
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much cognitive difficulty or dissonance: we bracket certain metaphysical and 
ontological presuppositions in order to be able to properly enjoy the fiction 
with which we are engaging.
But why do we care about being able to enjoy fiction? What value might 
it have for our lives? There are various answers one might provide here: that 
engaging with fiction allows us to expand our imaginative horizons, making us 
more flexible in our everyday lives; that it increases our sense of empathy by 
allowing us to engage with characters we will likely never meet; that it allows us 
to travel imaginatively to places and times to which we have not been (nor per-
haps has anyone else).19 Or perhaps engaging with fiction, like playing sports 
or music (or doing philosophy!), is enjoyable for its own sake. In any case, we 
would be hard-pressed to find someone who thinks that engaging with drama, 
literature, film, and the like does not contribute in any way to human flourish-
ing. In fact, I think most people would agree that their lives are in some way 
‘enriched’ by their engagement with fiction.20
Still, there are some persons for whom suspending disbelief, bracketing 
metaphysical considerations, or otherwise mentally compartmentalizing may 
be more difficult. And for such people, enjoying certain fictions (or being able 
to take them seriously) will not come as easily as for others. Then there are 
those persons who take fiction more seriously than their more skeptical coun-
terparts. Role-playing games, cosplay, fan fiction, historical re-enactments, and 
other similar activities represent ways in which fiction and pretense may take 
on a more concrete role in one’s everyday life. But such enthusiasts need not 
be characterized as delusional or pathological – they merely engage with fic-
tion in a more concrete fashion than those of us who simply leave the book 
on the nightstand. Of course, most of us fall somewhere in the middle of this 
spectrum.21
19   Keith Oatley, for example, argues that engaging with fiction can have beneficial results in 
the “exploration of the minds of others, investigation of relationships, dynamics of inter-
actions in groups, and grappling with the problems of selfhood”. Keith Oatley, Such Stuff 
as Dreams: The Psychology of Fiction (Oxford: Wiley, 2011), 167.
20   It is important here to note that certain types of fictional engagement may, in fact, be 
harmful, depending on the nature and content of the fiction with which one engages (see 
Keith Oatley, Such Stuff as Dreams, 167). But the same may be said for religious engage-
ment. Still, nothing about what I say here regarding the possibility of religious experience 
by engaging imaginatively with religious concepts hinges on this. One could also have 
religious experiences within a religion which is morally bad.
21   Similarly, there are often particular fictional contexts with which we find ourselves more 
able and/or willing to sincerely engage than others. I might be a huge Battlestar Galactica 
fan, where you find it difficult to take science fiction seriously. Perhaps you prefer 
historical fiction or romance novels. This may have important parallels in the religious 
73-88_HARDTKE_Chapter 4.indd   81 14/07/2016   6:22:12 PM
82 Griffioen
Yet regardless of where we find ourselves on this continuum, assuming we 
are capable of ‘letting go’ enough to enjoy fiction in some capacity, we will 
also notice that we appear to be capable of being emotionally affected by it. 
We cry when a beloved character dies; our flesh crawls when we watch a creepy 
horror film; we feel torn and upset when a character faces a moral dilemma; 
and we rejoice when the hero overcomes a difficult obstacle to triumph over 
evil. Still, we might wonder whether such phenomena represent genuine emo-
tions and, if so, whether such emotions might not be irrational, misplaced, or 
otherwise inappropriate, given that they have as (at least part of) their content 
non-existent entities and states of affairs. The answer that we give to this ques-
tion will affect the way we view the experiences of committed non-believers in 
imaginative religious contexts.
In a seminal piece on this question, Kendall Walton has argued that the 
feelings we experience when we encounter fiction are not really emotions at 
all – they are better understood as quasi-emotions.22 Although they bear cer-
tain similarities to ‘genuine’ emotions, they differ in that they do not require 
the existence of their objects and that they do not appear intrinsically tied to 
motivation and action. Colin Radford, on the other hand, has argued that 
the emotions themselves are genuine, but they are misdirected or irrational, 
since their objects do not exist.23 However, Tamar Szabó Gendler and Karson 
Kovakovich have (I think persuasively) argued against both of these posi-
tions, and with good reason.24 First, they note, it simply begs the question to 
assume that genuine emotions are only those whose objects exist or that all 
emotions with non-existent objects are, by virtue of this fact, irrational. Both 
claims threaten to reduce the debate to a mere lexical dispute.25 Further, they 
argue that it is false that fictional emotions are not linked to action. They cite 
a series of studies by Antonio Damasio which conclude that imagining cer-
tain (non-actual) practical consequences of hypothetical behavior triggers 
emotional mechanisms that serve as “somatic markers” which then assist in 
guiding future behavior. And the “simulated emotions” in play here are not 
case, since aesthetic preferences can and do play a role in one’s ability and willingness to 
sincerely participate in certain religious traditions or practices.
22   See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990), 195–202.
23   See Colin Radford, “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?”, Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 49 (1975), 67–80.
24   See Tamar Szabó Gendler and Karson Kovakovich, “Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions”, 
in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 241–256.
25   See ibid., 249.
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significantly different from the emotions we encounter when engaging with 
fiction. Thus, emotions that have as their objects entities or states of affairs the 
subject herself takes not to exist may not only motivate behavior; they might 
be crucial for the successful exercise of practical reasoning in the first place.26
Further, regarding Radford’s claim, it seems wrong to say that every ‘fictional 
emotion’ is irrational by virtue of being targeted at and/or triggered by a fic-
tional object. There certainly seem to be inappropriate emotional responses 
with regard to fiction. (We would think it inappropriate for someone to take joy 
in the moral dilemma in which the title character of Sophie’s Choice finds her-
self.) But the fact that there appear to be inappropriate emotional responses 
to fiction implies that there are also appropriate ones. Indeed, there would 
appear to be no possibility of a substantive debate about the appropriate way 
to feel within certain fictional contexts if all such emotions are per se irrational 
or inappropriate.
What is the upshot of this discussion? If Gendler and Kovakovich are 
right, and we can “respond with genuine, rational emotions to targets that we 
believe to be fictional”,27 then it does not seem all that far-fetched to extend 
this conclusion to religious emotions in the case of the non-believer. Now, it 
might be the case that the believer experiences such emotions more vividly 
or intensely than the non-believer (just as the death of a close friend affects 
me more strongly than the death of a beloved fictional character), but this is 
an empirical matter – one which I am not sure would be borne out in every 
case of religious emotion. Even if it were, however, it would only demonstrate 
that there is a quantitative, not a qualitative, difference in emotion between 
the religious believer and non-believer. Further, as with our engagement with 
fiction, engagement with religion might open us up to new ways of seeing 
the world and ourselves: it might allow us to develop a “sense and taste for the 
infinite”28 – to see the universe as disclosing transcendence, as a matter of 
“Ultimate Concern”29 – to understand our own contingency and our special 
place in the world. Viewing an occupation as a vocation, a calling, instead of a 
mere job may imbue our lives with a sense of meaning, even if we take there 
to be no one who has actually called us. Viewing our moral duty as divinely 
26   See Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making 
of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt, 1999), cited in Tamar Szabó Gendler and Karson 
Kovakovich, “Emotions”, 247–248.
27   Tamar Szabó Gendler and Karson Kovakovich, “Emotions”, 253.
28   See Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. 
Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
29   See Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).
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ordained may help us develop characters that are more virtuous and more 
loving, even if we think there is ultimately no ‘divine commander’.30 Indeed, 
emotions in simulative contexts might not only be important for practical 
reasoning – they may be necessary for us to view ourselves as agents-in-the-
world in the first place, and religious emotions have their place in this schema 
too. In any case, I think a case can plausibly be made that the imaginatively-
engaged religious life can and does (at least in some instances) contribute 
positively to human flourishing.
 What Kind of Religious Emotion?
However, one might object here that I am too hasty and too vague with my 
characterization of religious emotions. One might argue that while we may feel 
‘basic’ emotions like joy, sadness, anger, amusement, fear and so on in response 
to fictional characters and states of affairs, the emotional states characteristic 
of religious experience are not those we typically experience in fictional con-
texts. So what should we say here? Are the paradigmatic religious emotions 
of a kind that can (non-pathologically) be experienced by a non-believer? To 
begin, I think that at least some paradigmatic religious emotions are not par-
ticularly problematic for the non-believer. Awe, wonder, fear, mystery, Otto’s 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans, even Schleiermacher’s “feeling of absolute 
dependence”31 – I think all of these can be fairly straightforwardly experienced 
by the imaginatively-engaged non-believer. Indeed, imaginative engagement 
with particular religious concepts in certain contexts might be the exact kind 
of thing that makes such experiences possible for any subject, believer or not.
Interestingly, in none of the cases just mentioned is the actual target of 
the emotion God. I feel awe in response to a magnificent Alpine landscape; I 
wonder at the expanse of the night sky; I tremble at the uncanny stillness of 
an empty church; I thrill at the swelling of a choir’s voices; I feel ‘creaturely’ 
and dependent when I imagine myself as a tiny speck in a greater universe; 
and so on. In these kinds of emotional experiences, the direct target of my 
experience (and, in many cases, its proximate cause) is something worldly and 
immanent, something existent. In the latter case, it may even be my own self 
30   Further, we can imagine a philosophically-minded theist who finds theological intellectu-
alism more theoretically persuasive – yet who is (rightly) concerned about the sources of 
normativity – adopting a divine voluntarist model as a “useful fiction” to motivate action 
or serve as a practical guide to everyday life.
31   See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith.
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that is both the subject and the object of the emotion. Even for the believer, 
there is no direct perception of God here – indeed in many religious traditions, 
it would be heresy to maintain that such a thing is even possible. Where God is 
‘perceived’ by the believer in religious experience, God becomes present only 
indirectly, via the actual target of the experience.32 In any case, what makes 
these experiences religious has more to do with their being interpreted from 
within the framework of a religious tradition in which one is willingly and 
sincerely engaged, their being articulated with the use of religious terms and 
propositions, and their being colored by these concepts in a way that non- 
religiously interpreted experiences are not.
This is a kind of experience that both the believer and the non-believer can 
‘make’ (to speak, as the Germans do, of Erfahrung machen). And while such 
experiences may be correlated with a belief in the existence of the divine, 
they need not be. The inferences that one draws from a religious experience 
may be vast and wide-ranging. Thus, pace Wayne Proudfoot, I do not think 
that the noetic quality of a religious experience – its informative, cognitive 
aspect – must involve an explanatory judgment about the causal origin of the 
experience. Proudfoot maintains that were I to provide a wholly naturalistic 
explanation of my experience, I could not view it as religious.33 Yet anyone 
who has taken a hallucinogenic substance knows that one can be genuinely 
afraid of something they ‘know’ is a drug-induced hallucination. Instead, I 
would argue, the noetic quality of emotional religious experience has more to 
do with a kind of self-knowledge – one perhaps combined, in some cases, with a 
deeper sense of one’s relation to others – than with beliefs about the existence 
of a divine reality.
Still, one might argue, there are further paradigmatic religious attitudes – 
interactive, second-personal attitudes like those of gratitude, trust, and love – 
that may be closed off to the non-believer. Of course, unlike experiences of 
awe and wonder, none of these latter attitudes is, strictly speaking, a discrete 
32   This is, of course, in contrast to such accounts of religious or mystical experience that 
purport to be ‘direct perceptions’ of God. See, for example, William Alston’s Perceiving 
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
While I leave it open that such experiences may be possible, I do not think they are com-
mon within everyday religious practice.
33   See Wayne Proudfoot’s discussion of William James in his chapters on “Mysticism” and 
“Explanation” in Religious Experience. Proudfoot’s analysis of the explanatory feature of 
religious experience is much more nuanced and subtle than I can reproduce (or refute) 
here. However, suffice it to say that I part ways with him (and, apparently, with James 
and others) in claiming that an explanatory judgment is not necessary for religious 
experience.
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emotional state. They involve larger complexes of cognitive, affective, and voli-
tional states and activities that extend over time. I may feel thankful toward 
someone, but ultimately gratitude is something I show. I may ‘feel trusting’ 
toward someone, but trusting (and especially entrusting) is something I do. 
Something similar may be said for love. So engaging here goes beyond merely 
responding emotionally to a stimulus. It also involves something active, tem-
porally extended, and volitional.
But can the religious non-believer feel and do such things? In principle, I 
do not see why not. To be sure, such attitudes are not typical responses to fic-
tion. It sounds odd to talk about ‘trusting’ Harry Potter or being ‘grateful’ to 
Daenerys Targaryen. And we would think it borderline pathological if someone 
were to say that she, like Jane Eyre, were ‘in love’ with Mr. Rochester. Yet sim-
ply because we do not generally display interactive attitudes toward fictional 
characters does not mean we cannot display such attitudes toward non- 
existent entities, at least within contexts in which such attitudes are appro-
priate. First, as with the non-interactive attitudes discussed above, displaying 
these latter attitudes will also require a stretch of the imagination on the part 
of the believer. If ‘trust’, ‘gratitude’, and ‘love’ have a univocal (or even analo-
gous) meaning in religious and non-religious contexts, then even the religious 
believer must conceive of God as a creative, providential, personal being – an 
anthropomorphization that might require bracketing other things she takes to 
be true of God (like God’s eternality or immutability).34 Second, although we 
do not generally experience such attitudes when we engage with literary or 
dramatic fiction, it does not mean we are incapable of taking up an imagina-
tive second-person stance. Children often address imaginary persons in play, 
and even many adults engage in imaginary dialogues (including self-dialogues, 
in which we take the self as an Other). So it is not really a stretch to think that 
such imaginative second-person stances are psychologically possible.
Thus perhaps taking on a certain kind of imaginative, second-personal 
stance may make room for the possibility of a non-believer’s adopting the 
above kinds of attitudes. When we undertake an imagining of the world 
as created by a benevolent being, we may be able to view our lives as though 
they were gifts from God, allowing us to respond with a form of gratitude. The 
same type of imaginative stance may allow us to take on a kind of ‘willing pas-
sivity’, a trusting commitment to accepting what may befall one. Love is not far 
34   This is one way of expressing the tensions between apophaticism and cataphaticism or 
between God’s immanence and God’s transcendence in certain monotheistic contexts.
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behind here.35 If one can cash out these attitudes in this way, then, it seems 
that religious engagement may help foster such feelings in believers and non-
believers alike and that the imaginative employment of religious concepts may 
help to flesh them out or to give them more substance.36
 Conclusion: Religious Experience without Belief
In summary, I think there is a way of making sense of emotional religious expe-
rience that does not require belief in the existence or truth of the relevant reli-
gious concepts or propositions involved in that experience. There is certainly 
more to be said here, and a full-fledged account of the religious imagination 
still needs to be provided.37 But I hope to have shown that what is central to 
religious engagement is not necessarily belief, but rather a kind of volitional, 
imaginative commitment. The experiences that result from such commitment 
will involve a certain level of imaginative ‘interpretation’ (or Deutung) – a 
way of seeing things through a religious ‘lens’, as it were – but this need not 
threaten their (in-)genuineness. Furthermore, if I am right that certain forms 
of religious engagement may contribute positively to human flourishing, it 
would seem we should start rethinking the way we approach religious faith as 
well.38 Indeed, perhaps religious faith is less about what we believe and more 
about what we do with what we imagine. And if those things we imagine “don’t 
happen to be so”, perhaps “that’s just an unimportant technicality”.39
35   The idea of taking on an imaginative second-personal stance will be especially important 
in fleshing out an account of what might be going on in prayer as well.
36   For a fascinating example of exercises in pretense and play intended to cultivate a sense 
for second-personal interaction with God, see: Tanya M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2012).
37   For a few helpful sources on the religious imagination and belief, see: Garrett Green, 
Imagining God; Douglas Hedley, Living Forms of the Imagination (London: T&T Clark, 
2008); and, more recently, Graham Ward, Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).
38   This paper serves as a precursor to the account of religious faith I am currently develop-
ing. Unfortunately, I will have to save the intricacies of this view for another occasion.
39   I would like to thank Ulrich Schmiedel, Tobias Tan, and Thomas Hardtke for the orga-
nization of the conference at which an earlier version of this paper was presented. I 
would also like to thank Jörg Lauster, Graham Ward, Scott O’Leary, Ian James Kidd, David 
Cooper, Clare Carlisle, Dina Emundts, Jochen Briesen, Ursula Renz, Evan Fales, Greg 
Landini, Daniel Schumacher, Arie Griffioen, and all the others who have given me helpful 
feedback on some of the central ideas of this paper.
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